TAEF visiting fellow Dr. Sana Hashmi was quoted in this SCMP article by Maria Siow, who also interviewed several other experts of international relations and former government officials on respective stances of China, India and Indonesia over Russian invasion in Ukraine.

 

Two major issues are being questioned in this report: How Beijing and Delhi acknowledge the invasion of Ukraine could impact their standing in ASEAN, and their complex relations Russia. Meanwhile, Indonesia is reliant on Russia for maintenance of its defence equipment and has not described the war in Ukraine as an invasion. 

 

Sana Hashmi, a visiting fellow at TAEF said that Quad was renewed in recent months primarily to address the China challenge and Russia "isn't a part of that package". While there is greater convergence between India and the West in the Indo-Pacific region, it is still "not mature enough for India to abandon its current position", Hashmi said, adding that the WEst needs to invest more in its relations with India if it wants Delhi "to include issues other than China". 

 

Beijing is attempting to shift the narrative on Ukraine "from the fact of invasion, to the unreliability of NATO" said former senior Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan.

 

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in its latest State of Southeast Asia Survey released last month found that among 1677 repondents, 58.1% had either little or no confidence in China to do the right thing to contribute to global peace.

 

In Indonesia, its people decried their country's lacklustre response on social media. Gilang Kembara, a researcher at the CSIS Indonesia said that Jakarta's weak response is caused by its dependence on Russia for the maintenance of its defence equipment. Gilang said that Indonesia is likely to take a tougher stance if China decides to launch attacks on Taiwan, as "it will carry a greater impact to Indonesia, particularly if China also decides to attack in the South China Sea." 

 

-Dr. Sana Hashmi, Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation

 

Common concerns and shared interests are leading the liberal democracies to greater strategic alignment. One of the most important outcomes has been the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad from herein), comprising Australia, India, Japan, the United States in 2017. Amid rising tensions with China, the Quad is increasingly emerging as a focal point in the foreign policies of the four countries. Several factors led to this development. The realization among the Indian leadership that the India-China border dispute is no more about differing perception but an attempt by China to keep India preoccupied in more than a 70-year-old dispute in the aftermath of the 2017 Doklam standoff was a major factor for India to reconsider its stand on the Quad and eventually its China policy. This coincided with the growing United States-China rivalry. Japan has been the strongest proponent of the Quad, whereas Australia, which was considered the weakest link in the first iteration of the Quad, began to witness deterioration in relations with China. 

 

China’s growing aggression is emerging as a common threat to the Quad countries, and the revival of the grouping is an attempt by the four countries to find a way to deal with the China challenge without getting involved in a full-blown conflict with China. It is in this context, the paper outlines the trajectory of the Quad, its revival, China’s response, and charts out the way forward.