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TAEF BRIEF
June 17, 2022
No. 91 |
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CONTENT
-TAEF Updates
-TAEF Commentaries
-New Southbound Policy News
-Regional Headlines |
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Application Extended: 2022 SEASAT Youth Camp |
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Date of Event: August 3 - August 5, 2022
Entering its fourth year, the Southeast Asia-South Asia-Taiwan (SEASAT) Youth Camp, jointly organized by the TAEF and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), is making its comeback for 2022 on August 3.
With the theme “Asian Youth’s Democratic Participation in the Post-Pandemic Era”, this year’s SEASAT Youth Camp aims to promote cooperation and exchanges among Asian youth on contemporary challenges in the post-pandemic era. There are nine core topics in focus, namely “digital,” “education,” “migrants,” “ocean,” “culture,” “resilience,” “activism,” “communication,” and “youth”— with the initial letters of these keywords constitute spelling “democracy”.
Participants will have the opportunity to engage with scholars, NGO founders, civil leaders, and experts across sectors through a series of workshops and seminars. There is also a tour to a startup hub in Taipei, which hosts a number of world-renowned enterprises. The list of exclusive activities goes on!
As the program is receiving enthusiastic responses from prospective participants, TAEF and AIT decide to extend the application to June 22, 2022.
Find out more about the application details on our
Facebook.
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Join “The 4th World Congress of Taiwan Studies: Taiwan in the Making” |
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Date of Event: June 27 - June 29, 2022
The 4th World Congress of Taiwan Studies will take place in Seattle between June 27 – 29, 2022. This Congress will be hosted jointly by Academia Sinica and the University of Washington, Seattle, with the UW Taiwan Studies Program (TSP) being the local host. The general theme of this Congress is Taiwan in the Making, which will explore the processes, forces, and dynamics that made and continue to make Taiwan.
This will be the first World Congress of Taiwan Studies held in North America and would bring together the world’s leading as well as rising scholars from Taiwan, Japan, Asia, North America, Europe, and Australia.
Dr. Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, the Chairman of TAEF is invited as one of the keynote speakers on the first day (June 27) of the Congress. Drawing from his extensive years of work and observations, Dr. Hsiao will share his personal insights on the Taiwan context under the theme “From Theorizing Taiwan to Taiwan Theories Making: My Reflection.”
The Congress will be live-streamed on Youtube. For more details, please visit
the official webpage of the Congress.
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Liberty Times Net
Analyzing ASEAN's Responses to the Russia-Ukraine War: National Interests Come First |
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June 15, 2022
-Dr. Alan H. Yang, Executive Director, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation
-Han Hsiang, Ph.D. student, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University
-Chittaworn Warasiriphong, Ph.D. student, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University
As the call for sanctions against Russia continues to grow in the international sphere, countries in Asia seem to hold a somewhat different stance on the Russia-Ukraine war than the European and American countries.
Overall, forging an internal consensus on pressuring Russia is not among the most urgent interests of the ASEAN grouping. According to their responses to the anti-Russia movement, these countries can be generalized into three categories: active supporters, ambiguous actors, and resolute opposers.
Singapore represents an active supporter of sanctions against Russia. The country was among the first to join the US and the EU in sanctioning Russia, targeting their banks and electronic products. The rationality is that Singapore does not maintain close economic and trade ties with Russia. Also, it does not rely on Russia for arms purchases like most of its ASEAN neighbors.
Thailand and Cambodia are among the ambiguous actors in the region. Thailand-Russia relations have been maintained for over 124 years, and Thailand’s tourism sector depends highly on Russian visitors. Cambodia's primary concern is also diplomatic—Cambodia and Russia established their diplomatic ties back in 1960. Cambodia has since then relied on Russia for military modernization and arms purchase.
The original article is published in Chinese, but you can read more from the English excerpt
over here.
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CNN-News 18
Will China Maintain Status Quo over Taiwan? Why These Two Countries Should be Treated Differently |
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June 14, 2022
-Dr. Sana Hashmi, Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation
In the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue, Wei Fenghe, China’s Defence Minister, declared , “If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight, We will fight at all costs. And we will fight to the very end. This is the only choice for China.” Wei called Taiwan “first and foremost China’s Taiwan”. This is far from the truth. Taiwan is not China’s to claim and is different from China in a variety of areas.
Taiwan is emerging as the biggest flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s aggression against Taiwan and latter’s resistance against it have acquired salience in the recent past, and with that the contrast in the two countries is visible than ever before. Two countries across the Taiwan Strait exhibit stark differences — one is demonstrating bullying tendencies and showing aggression, and the other is fighting for its existence and safety of its 24 million people; one is an authoritarian state, the other is a near-perfect democracy; one handled the Covid-19 pandemic while keeping the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in consideration, the other handled the pandemic with a people-centric approach; one that expelled foreign correspondents, the other welcomed foreign correspondents when China’s door was closed for them.
In the past five years, Taiwan has undergone tremendous changes. Some of the changes, at least in the outlook of the Taiwanese people, have come about after China’s breaching of the Hong Kong handover treaty and the subsequent treatment of the Hong Kongers. There is a greater realisation that one country, two systems is not workable for Taiwan and its people.
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NEW SOUTHBOUND POLICY NEWS |
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Taipei Times
For Taiwan, Reading the Moment is Essential
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June 13, 2022
There has been a lot of global media frenzy about Taiwan’s security in recent weeks. Experts have debated what lessons China might be drawing from Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine. Pundits grew excited when President Biden declared in Tokyo that the United States would intervene militarily if Taiwan was attacked. Yet, below this exuberant froth, policy discussions in the United States, Asia, and Europe have remained relatively steady.
Overall, the depth of America’s engagement in Ukraine reflects the Biden administration’s determination to remain a global power. The United States will not turn its back on Europe to concentrate its military focus in Asia.
Yet standing firm to support Europe does not equal diminishment of focus on Asia. In the past several weeks alone, President Biden has hosted leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington for the first time. He traveled to Seoul and Tokyo, where he met with leaders from the Quadrilateral Grouping (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), in addition to strengthening bilateral and trilateral relations in Northeast Asia. He launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Importantly for Taiwan, the Biden administration also committed to the Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a new effort to break the logjam and invigorate US-Taiwan economic ties. President Biden also signed legislation to push for Taiwan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly and Secretary of State Antony Blinken rallied other countries to lend support for Taiwan’s participation.
In other words, the Biden administration is deepening its investments in Asia and upping its focus on Taiwan. The more pressure Beijing has placed on Taiwan, the more visible America’s support for Taiwan has grown.
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Taipei Times
Why Taiwan Should Be In the IPEF
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June 11, 2022
The launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on the sidelines of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit in Tokyo on May 23 received huge global attention, primarily because the IPEF has crystallized the Quad-plus formula to develop a strong regional economic grouping to challenge China’s dominance in the region.
Of course, one country that keenly observed this development was Taiwan. In fact, with Taiwan’s strong economic base and its security challenges emanating from China among other factors, sections of academics in Taiwan, the US, and elsewhere expected Taipei to be included in the IPEF. Therefore, its exclusion disappointed a majority of them.
However, it needs to be understood and stressed that the absence of Taiwan from the IPEF also runs a high risk of the failure of this initiative for various reasons.
First, one of the major pillars of IPEF is to build trade and technology policies to promote economic activity and investment, promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and benefit workers and consumers. Taiwan’s expertise in advanced technology is globally recognized. This can be gauged from the fact that nearly 80 percent of global network security hardware equipment is produced in Taiwan. With the digitization of the world economy, Taiwan can offer its expertise in making it more secure and reliable. After all, Taiwan faces cyberattacks from China on a regular basis. More to the point, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy completely reciprocates the IPEF.
Read more
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The Economic Times
India Likely to Have Taiwanese Semiconductor Hub After Inking FTA
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June 09, 2022
India and Taiwan are marching ahead to ink the much-awaited Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It will have a prime focus on having a semiconductor manufacturing hub in India by a Taiwanese company. If this gets through, it will be a win-win situation for both the parties as India aspires to become a global semiconductor manufacturing hub and Taiwan wants to move away its business from China.
According to various reports, India and Taiwan signed a landmark Bilateral Investment Agreement in 2018 to promote investment flow between the two sides. The Agreement seeks to ensure protection for Taiwanese investments in line with international standards, as well as the safety and rights of Taiwanese investors in India. India's latest Act East Policy and Taiwan's New Southbound Policy too buttress the economic cooperation between the two.
In the last few years, India has been actively promoting cooperation with Taiwan in trade, investment, tourism, culture, education, and people-to-people exchanges. Both the countries have also constituted teams for the expansion of fruitful collaboration in education and skill development.
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Asia Times
Southeast Asians Sticking with China on Taiwan: Survey
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June 01, 2022
A recent Democracy Perception Index survey of worldwide public opinion found that a majority of Southeast Asians would not support their governments cutting economic ties with China if Beijing launched an invasion of Taiwan.
Southeast Asian governments, all of which recognize Beijing’s so-called “One China” policy, are extremely hesitant to discuss Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan’s dealings in the region are also kept as quiet as possible by Southeast Asian governments, which are wary of angering Beijing.
In 2016, during her first term in office, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen launched a New Southbound Policy (NSP) to improve relations with Southeast Asia and South Asia. Most cooperation stems from economic links. In April, the total trade volume between Taiwan and the 10 ASEAN countries was US$11.5 billion, up a quarter from April 2021, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. Singapore and Malaysia are the region’s largest trading partners with Taiwan. An estimated 37% of Taiwan’s foreign direct investment in 2021 went to Southeast Asia, according to data from Taiwan’s Investment Commission. However, Taiwanese investments tend not to attract headlines. Southeast Asian governments rarely give them much fanfare, wary of Beijing’s response.
Even if most Southeast Asians don’t want their governments to cut ties with China in the event it invades Taiwan, that doesn’t necessarily mean they aren’t sympathetic to Taiwan.
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Fulcrum
(ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute)
Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: The Paradox of Peace and Power
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June 13, 2022
The convening of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 (SLD22) was a success in and of itself as this demonstrated the region’s confidence and determination to get back to business after a two-year hiatus due to Covid-19. Yet the spectre of war has taken the pandemic’s place in casting a long and grim shadow over the defence summit. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict rages on with severe economic and strategic ramifications for the region, the threat to peace has never been so intimately and imminently felt.
In view of Russia’s aggression that violates Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the duel between the “rule of law” and the “right of might” was a common refrain at SLD22. Many speakers extrapolated from the Ukraine example to warn about the need to manage Asia’s existing flashpoints.
Whether directly or otherwise, the U.S. and its partners at SLD22 — Japan, Australia, the UK and Netherlands — pointed their fingers at China for “its unilateral attempts to change the status quo” and its “more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.”
During his turn to address the conference, Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe dismissed these as “smearing accusations.” Such barbs traded between China and Western powers have been somewhat of a trademark at previous Shangri-La Dialogues, but the latest ones underscore the worsening tensions and distrust among the major powers.
Read more
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The Diplomat
Why the Muslim World Is Turning on India
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June 08, 2022
Early this week, New Delhi was busy putting out serious diplomatic fires across the Muslim world.
Following derogatory comments on Islam and its revered Prophet Muhammad by leaders of the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) last week, Arab social media was ablaze with indignation. Then, over a dozen countries and counting — ranging from Saudi Arabia and Iran to the Maldives and Indonesia — lodged unprecedented official protests with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.
The timing of the diplomatic protests is as striking as the protests themselves. The comments made last week by the BJP’s spokespersons were far from the most odious developments in India’s political discourse in recent times.
Over the last couple of years, BJP leaders have participated in conferences that have publicly called for the genocide of Muslims. In 2019, following protests against the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), Modi himself told a political rally that the protestors can be identified “by their clothes” — ostensibly referring to the traditional attire worn by Muslims. One minister even called for them to be shot down on the street, calling them “traitors.” He continues to serve in Modi’s cabinet.
Why did the Arab world ignore all these red flags and suddenly decide to draw the line at blasphemous comments on the Prophet?
Part of the imperative is geopolitical.
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The Economist
Vietnam is Leading the Transition to Clean Energy in South-East Asia
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June 02, 2022
In the four years to 2021, the share of electricity generated by solar in Vietnam increased from practically nothing to nearly 11%. Not only was this a faster rate of increase than almost anywhere else in the world. It is a bigger share than larger economies such as France or Japan have managed. By last year, Vietnam had become the world’s tenth-biggest producer of solar power.
Underscoring his country’s commitment to the energy transition, Pham Minh Chinh, Vietnam’s prime minister, vowed in November to stop building new coal-powered plants and to reduce his country’s emissions to net-zero by 2050.
Other South-East Asian countries hoping to up their game can learn a few lessons from Vietnam. It has quadrupled its wind and solar capacity since 2019. This “extraordinary achievement” is primarily the result of political will and market incentives, according to a study conducted by Paul Burke and Thang Do of the Australian National University, and others.
In 2017 the government began paying solar-power suppliers a fixed-rate “feed-in tariff” of as much as 9.35 us cents for every kilowatt-hour they delivered to the grid, which was generous given that costs typically range between 5 and 7 cents per kilowatt-hour. The result is that 100,000 rooftop solar panels were installed in 2019 and 2020, increasing the country’s solar capacity by a whopping 16 gigawatts. Other South-East Asian countries have tried feed-in tariffs, but they have been insufficiently enticing.
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